Joanna Chi-Hsin Kang’s Paper Topic:
“The Emergence of Singlehood in the 20th and early 21st century: Hong Kong,
Japan, and Taiwan”
Introduction
In East Asia, Confucian philosophy is the dominant value system, especially its
prominent doctrine of filial piety. Filial piety is a requirement of life, and being filial
is an essential approach to acquire public recognition as an individual with integrity.
The most unfilial and unforgivable behavior is being unmarried or sonless. 1
However, there are more and more Asian women who are immersed in this social
milieu yet are choosing to embrace their singlehood. The liberation of Asian women
is one of the momentous outcomes of Western modernization. This is also a
trans-cultural trend that spans nations, societies, and ideologies. What reasons impel
Asian women to choose a generally acknowledged difficult lifestyle? Why would
they rather be stigmatized as a social outsider than have a reputation of virtue as a
member of a collectivist society? This article will analyze the factors that impact
these Asian women’s decision-making processes and the forces which lead them into
an unconventional lifestyle in East Asian society: singlehood. These arguments will
be embodied and compared through specific case analyses from women in Hong
Kong, Taiwan, and Japan.
Single Women in East Asia: Regional Comparisons
Hong Kong
I. Background information
The group of single women in Hong Kong has demonstrated that numbers do talk.
According to the 2003 Population Census Report from the Census and Statistics
Department of the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Hong
Kong has a population of 6.8 million; the number of never-married women between
the ages of 18 to 60 is over 653,400. Moreover, both widows, who are dependent on
their adult children and single women between the ages of 18 to 60, number at
approximately 49,800. In short, these unmarried women occupy 10.2% of the total
population in Hong Kong which is about 700,000 and impressively, most of them
have received at least a secondary education. In addition, the average age of a single
woman in Hong Kong is 41 years, which is older than her counterpart in Mainland
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China of 36 years and the global average age of 39 years.2
П. Factors of remaining single
The Young Women Christian Association (Y.W.C.A) in Hong Kong, the Centre
on Behavioral Health of The University of Hong Kong, and one influential periodical,
Ming Pao Monthly, all have deeply researched on the enigmatic issue of why many
modern Hong Kong women are prone to remain single when they are more
empowered than ever. After integrating these analytical contents, we can distinctly
attribute several reasons to this prevailing social phenomenon. They are the
disproportion of both sexes, the marital concerns of men in Hong Kong, the highly
economical independence of Hong Kong women, and the impact of Western
Modernization.3
First of all, the group of marriageable women in Hong Kong is quite larger than
marriageable men. According to the data from the Census and Statistics Department
of the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region has shown that,
in 2002, women between the ages of 22 to 44 outnumbered their male counterparts by
210,000.4 Furthermore, it leads to the disproportion of both sexes in current Hong
Kong society and lack of available bachelors is one of the major difficulties when
Hong Kong women consider their marriages. Furthermore, one of the main causes is
that there are more and more male Hong Kong citizens marrying Mainland brides, and
also helping these brides to move to Hong Kong. According to a recent demographic
survey, since 1996, this growing tendency gradually leads to the disproportion of both
sexes in Hong Kong. For instance, in 2006, the number of registered newlywed
couples is 50,300 pairs, and 18,000 pairs out of that number are interregional
marriages. It reflects that at least 36% of the brides are mainlanders.5
Secondly, Hong Kong women’s current pairing predicament has gotten worse
because Hong Kong males are more favorable towards brides from Mainland China.6
Owing to the deep influence of Han’s patrilineal ideology, usually a Chinese man is
expected to play the dominant role in a family, and he prefers to have a wife with less
2
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education than himself.7 Marrying a more feminine, submissive, and docile figure
will fulfill the image of a recognizable couple in his family and the society. Hence,
those Hong Kong men are less likely to choose these empowered and modernized
Hong Kong women for marriage.8
Moreover, greater communication and interaction between Hong Kong and
Mainland China have made these comparatively more conservative Mainland Chinese
brides become available and appealing in the marriage pool. This is one of the
primary reasons for the increase of single women in Hong Kong. Thirdly, thanks to
the British government’s policy of compulsory popularized education which started in
the 1970s, it has widely upgraded the educational standard of the citizens of Hong
Kong, women in particular. The percentage of college educated females had
increased from 30.3% in 1986 to 66.8% in 2000. In that same year, all medical
schools in Hong Kong had more than 59.5% female students majoring in medicine,
dentistry, pharmacy, and nursing. Also, 62.4% of students who were studying
business and management in college were female. Furthermore, female students
occupied 67.8% in the social sciences field; the field of liberal arts had 78% female
students; and in education, female students dominated 72.7%. In 2001, 15.1% of
women were college educated, compared with 17.8% of men. Women also made up
more than half, 51.6%, of the students studying in college-level institutions in 2001.9
Subsequently, the percentage of educated women has been increasing rapidly
since the 1970s, and it has assisted women in developing professional skills for
participation in the labor market. During the 70s and 80s, Hong Kong’s booming
trading market provided the needs and openings for competent workers, and women
were largely hired by industries.10
After more than 15 years’ devotion, today’s Hong Kong women have achieved a
remarkable scenario in their workplace of equal salary and benefits, especially for
those who live alone. “The median income of working women and men also exhibited
a different pattern, while the median income of working women living alone at
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$15,000HKD was higher than that of their male counterparts at $14,000HKD.”11
Nevertheless, these economical achievements have also accompanied some
far-reaching reforms of their changing traditional roles. For example, women in
Hong Kong now expect more from their potential spouses, especially since their own
criteria of education, profession, and financial capability have been highly elevated,
and it adds to the challenges of identifying acceptable candidates.12
In terms of the idea of Western individualism and liberation, an individual would
be accredited as a valuable one as long as she could be self-sufficient and independent,
but not in terms of the cultural codes of Han’s patrilineal society. In a traditional
Han society, a woman would be regarded as worthless if she couldn’t bear sons, and
she was powerless to challenge these ingrained unfairness as well.13 Just as one old
Chinese saying goes, “A woman shares the fate of the man she married, no matter
who he is.” At the present day, as a result of the influence of western modernization
and education, those empowered Hong Kong women have gained infinite possibilities
through their own intelligence, diligence, and persistence. Accordingly, they
become more reluctant to accept the oppressive traditional role in Han society, and
those who don’t want to compromise remain single.
Japan
I. Background information
In light of the Statistical Research from the Ministry of International Affairs and
Communication in Japan, in the early 1970s, the number of marriages per year
exceeded one million. The marriage rate at that time averaged above 10% (per 1,000
populations), highlighting signs of a marriage boom. In 2006, there were 740,000
marriages, and the marriage rate was 5.8 % (per 1,000 populations). In the same
year, the mean age for a first marriage was 30.0 for men and 28.2 for women,
increasing by 1.7 years and 2.6 years from the previous year, respectively. In the
past twenty years, the declining marriage rate and the older marrying age in recent
years are considered to be two major factors behind the downward trend in the live
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birth rate.14(See Figure 2.7andTable2.6)
In contrast, divorces have shown an upward trend since the 1960s, hitting a peak
of 290,000 in 2002. Since then, the number of divorces and the divorce rate both have
declined for four years straight. In 2006, the number of divorces totaled 257,000, and
the divorce rate was 2.04%.

Furthermore, for most people in Japan, where unmarried parents are still rare, the
main “benefit” of a marriage is children.15 That is why some chauvinistic government
officials and conservative media outlets judged these single or childless women as
“selfish” because they are devastating the foundation of society by refusing to get
married and have children. Japanese women’s emerging singlehood has been
eclipsed by the issue of long-term low fertility rate. However, their reluctance to get
married is actually the primary factor that determines the phenomenon of low fertility.
In January 2007, Japan’s Health Minister, Hakuo Yanagisawa, referred to women
as “birth-giving machines” in a speech at a local political meeting. He called for
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women to try their best to have children in order to counter Japan’s plummeting birth
rate and aging population. He said: “Because the number of birth-giving machines
and devices is fixed, all we can ask for is for them to do their best per head,” and he
added: “although it may not be so appropriate to call them machines.”16 Even in
today’s Japan, this kind of biased attitude still exists in the public forum.
In fact, the numbers of women who are refusing to play the role of
“birth-machine” continues to grow; the percentage of Japanese women in their late
20s who have not married has increased from 30% to about 50% in the last 15 years.
In addition, for the first time in 2007, 25% of all Japanese women aged 30 to 35 are
unmarried. It is an unprecedented change in a patriarchal and conservative society
like Japan, a place where marriage was once valued as an imperative obligation and
priority for a woman.17
П. Factors of remaining single
The journalist of BBC News, Sarah Buckley, unveiled Japanese women’s
changing attitudes toward marriage and why they are wary to wed.18 She concluded
that the main factors which are stimulating more and more Japanese women to
embrace the single life are the enormously imbalanced division of housework, the
incorrigible and inflexible labor market, and the modern ideas of liberation. In
contemporary Japanese society, male chauvinism still dominates. It is reflected in
several observable facts, based on the briefing of Japan’s changing demographics
from The Economist in July 2007.19 The researchers stated that the imbalance of
household division is one of the crucial factors which lead to the serious issue of the
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fast-aging and shrinking population in Japan. They also interviewed Mr. Hideki
Yamada, the director for policy on aging and fertility in the Cabinet Office. “It's
embarrassing to say this,” admits Mr. Yamada, “but after a first child is born, the
husband often doesn't do his bit helping out at home.” In fact, this idea is also
associated with cultural habit. Kuniko Inoguchi, Minister for Gender Issues and
Social Affairs under Mr. Koizumi, says “Boys are pampered at home by their mothers
and expect the same treatment—no nappy-changing, no washing up—later from their
wives.” A lot of modern Japanese women seem to avoid this predictable
circumstance by avoiding marriage, but how do they escape? Masahiro Yamada, a
sociology professor at Tokyo Gakugei University, after completing a variety of
surveys coined the title “parasite single” and pointed out that more than 70% of single
women in Tokyo who live at home and about half of them pay rent to their parents.20
According to him, the main reason why these single women remain at home is that
life at home is too comfortable, compared to married life. This young generation
was born and “spoiled” in an affluent time; moreover, unmarried daughters usually
expect to live with their parents until they get married. Also, they don’t need to do
laundry, cooking, or other housework because their own mothers are playing the
major domestic roles for them. Nevertheless, once they decide to get married, they
will play the part that their mother always played: taking care of husbands, having
children, and being decent full-time housewives. For many Japanese women, it
seems like an either/or situation—work and embrace financial independence or get
married and look after a house and children. This dilemma is aggravated by the
obstinate labor market in Japan. Just like one Japanese woman, Hiroe Shibata, who
works for a multinational pharmaceutical company in Tokyo, responded to BBC’s
journalist Sarah Buckley, “If you get married, your parents expect you to have a baby.
If you have a baby, it’s going to be difficult to manage your work and bring up
children.”21 In addition, Tamako Sarada, a well-known Japanese writer said, “In the
United States or Europe, it is possible to pursue a career even after having a baby, but
in Japan, if after marrying, a woman then realizes there is something she wants to do
in her previous workplace, she has almost no chance to come back.”22 That’s a
common predicament which is always haunting modern Japanese women’s minds.
In addition, there is one vivid story from The Economist which reveals how
20
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severe this topic is, and how Yasuyuki Nambu, a successful Japanese businessman,
utilizes his vision and empathy to make Japan’s labor market more flexible to
women.23 He established a non-profit organization to place women in flexible,
part-time jobs because he was struck by the brutal injustices of Japan’s workplace
after he graduated from college in 1976. Nambu found that men were far more
likely to be hired than women and were paid much more for the same job, and women
who left their jobs to have a family found returning to work almost impossible.
The wage gap between men and women in Japan resulted from several factors.
The most significant one is a common practice in many Japanese enterprises—the
seniority wage system. Since women would resign for reasons of marriage,
childbirth, and childcare, they are not expected to serve the company as long as their
male counterparts. The difference of men and women’s average length of service for
their companies directly reflects the great gap of their wage.24
Therefore, Yasuyuki Nambu decided to help these married women to find flexible
jobs which they can balance with child-caring and housework. After a while, his
father suggested turning this job-placement scheme into a commercial venture. The
result was Pasona, a firm that now has annual revenues of around $2 billion yen and
which sends around a quarter of a million people off to a job every day. The great
amount of money he has earned implies how great this need is, and how unequal and
rigid the labor market for Japanese women is.
In January 2008, The Japan Times published an article titled “Making day care fit
real needs: Deregulation of Japan's licensed nursery system threatens its
effectiveness”. The columnist, Suzannah Tartan, reported that: “A study in the Asian
Economic Journal in 2005 estimated that the total number of families in Japan with
mothers who would like to work but believe they cannot get a day-care spot was
nearly equal to the total number of children in day care from ages 1 to 3. In other
words, if day-care space were available, a much higher percentage of mothers would
return to the workforce.”25
Furthermore, the idea of liberation and individualism brings struggles for women
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in current Japan. They are grappling with a choice between traditional roles and
modern freedoms. Their rising self-awareness is now fighting against social
expectations. For instance, there is one extraordinary example to embody this
tension from the clash of tradition and modernity: Japan’s Princess, Masako. After
she married the Prince and entered the Imperial family, she was forced to sacrifice her
high-flying and beloved diplomatic career to concentrate on bearing a male heir. In
early 2004, she was diagnosed with a nervous disorder due to stress.26
In addition to this concrete case, there are some pop-cultural idioms that can
partly reflect the views held by Japanese patriarchal society. These terms include the
Christmas cakes, the New Year’s Eve noodles, and the Underdogs. During the 1990s,
a popular saying was, “Japanese women are like Christmas cakes. If they surpass
the 25th, 【Christmas day or their own birthday】, they will be difficult to dispose of.”
A woman’s value in the “marriage market” is based on her age. Once she is over 25,
she will lose her competitiveness and attraction quickly.27 It was quite a prevalent
term to mock unmarried women. After the 1990s, due to Japan’s fast changing
economy, women have contributed more labor force than ever, and it naturally led to
the delay of their marriageable age. As a consequence, this cursed number became
31, the New Year’s Eve noodles.28 In the traditional Japanese society, it is an ancient
custom that people must eat long Buckwheat Soba noodles on New Year’s Eve.
It
turned into another stigma to satirize unmarried women who are over 30. Nobody
will eat New Year’s Eve noodles after December 31st, thereby inferring that no man
will think a 30-year-old woman is still desirable, or at least not eligible enough to
marry. These discriminatory verbal abuses reflect the growing tide of popular
opinion by the shrinking population and declining fertility. These two social
phenomena are related. As the shrinking population problem becomes more severe,
the blame placed upon single women becomes more intense.
As a result, a brilliant female writer, Sakai Junko, wrote one bestseller named
The Underdogs’ Yowl (MAKEINU NO TOOBOE) in 2002 which has sold millions of
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copies in Japan. The term, Makeinu, actually comes from a folk idiom.29 Sakai
Junko quoted it to categorize unmarried and childless Japanese women as Makeinu.
In a narrow sense, it means “losers” and “ones who failed in the battles”. In this
spellbinding book, she tried to analyze why more and more Japanese women would
rather be labeled as stale cakes or noodles than submit to marriage. In addition, Miss
Sakai Junko is an “underdog” herself.
She interpreted with empathy that many
unmarried women are not intentionally resisting the entire social custom. Japanese
women remain single because they have doubted whether marriage can bring a better
living standard; by getting married they might lose their freedom and financial
independence.
Before this unconventional sentiment occurred, many young
Japanese women were longing for married life, particularly during the period after the
burst of the bubble economy.30
On the other hand, this enlarging group of Underdogs would represent the newly
developed liberalization and individualism in Japan, and how the modern education
has inculcated and stimulated them to embrace their own individuality and
self-realization. Accordingly, this pervasive tendency of being single certainly
reflects the modern liberation of women in Japan.
Taiwan
І. Background information
Based on the data from the Department of Statistics which is subordinate to the
Ministry of the Interior in Taiwan, in 1994, the number of marriages was 171,074; the
marriage rate was 8.1%. In 2004, there were 129,274 marriages, and the marriage
rate was 5.7%. The proportion of marriageable single women has changed swiftly as
well; they rose from minority to majority in one decade. For instance, in 1983, the
unmarried rate of Taiwanese women between the ages of 20 to 24 was 62.6%. In
2004, it became 89.5%. Moreover, another group of the ages of 25 to 29 was 21.0%
in 1983, and in 2004, the unmarried rate had escalated to 59.1%.
Furthermore, this formidable increase of unmarried rate also can be seen in
women of the ages of 30 to 34. In 1983, the unmarried rate of this group was 8.7%;
in 2004, it grew to 26.9%.
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Table 1-1: Rate of increasing unmarried women in Taiwan
Ages/
Unmarried
Rate (♀)

1983

1988

1993

2000

2003

2004

15-19

96.1%

97.5%

97.5%

98.4%

98.9%

99.2%

20-24

52.6%

72.4%

76.3%

84.1%

88.0%

89.5%

25-29

21.0%

27.9%

36.0%

47.5%

55.8%

59.1%

30-34

8.7%

10.7%

14.5%

20.8%

25.1%

26.9%

35-39

4.8%

6.5%

8.4%

11.3%

13.8%

14.8%

Source: Department of Statistics, the Ministry of the Interior in Taiwan

In comparison, the number of divorces has sustained a lofty peak recently in three
years. In 2004, the number of divorces totaled 62,635, and the divorce rate was
2.8%. Still, it was 2.9% in 2003, and 2.7% in 2002. Compared to fourteen years
ago, in 1994, the number of divorces totaled 31,889, and the divorce rate was 1.5%.
Additionally, the female participation in the labor market has also hit the highest
point in history. In 1999, over 46.0% of women were participating in Taiwan’s labor
market, and the number was over 3.85 million. Moreover, the number of female
labor has increased to 4.27 million in 2004; the participant rate was 47.7%. Further,
Taiwan has a population of 230 million, and the labor force occupied about 1/3 of it.
Evidently, the female laborers force has engaged a large percentage of the entire labor
market in Taiwan. It also reflected on the standard of wages. In 1999, a female
laborer could gain 73.6% of a male laborer’s average monthly salary. In 2004, it
reached 77.6%.31
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Table 1-2: The female participants in the labor market
Year

The number of available female
labor
(per 10,000 population)

Rate of female
participation in the labor
market

1999

385.6

(3.85million)

46.0%

2000

391.7

(3.91million)

46.0%

2001

397.7

(3.97million)

46.1%

2002

407.4

(4.07million)

46.6%

2003

417.2

(4.17million)

47.1%

2004

427.2

(4.27million)

47.7%

Source: Department of Statistics, the Ministry of the Interior in Taiwan

Table 1-3: The rising wages of female laborers
Year

The average monthly salary of one
female employee (NTD)

Percentage of a male
laborer’s monthly salary

1999

34,016

73.6%

2000

35,066

74.1%

2001

35,683

75.8%

2002

35,955

77.7%

2003

36,548

77.9%

2004

37,104

77.6%

Source: Department of Statistics, the Ministry of the Interior in Taiwan

П. Factors of remaining single
In August 2005, during Chinese Valentine’s Day, one popular and
business-oriented magazine in Taiwan, Cheers, had presented an elaborate survey on
the new challenges of Taiwanese career women. This cover story, titled “The Novel
Definition of Work & Love”, sharply illustrated that today’s Taiwanese women are
inclined to remain single but also listed the main factors that cause women’s hesitant
attitudes towards marriage.32 Briefly speaking, there are several reasons to propel
them to do so: the rising self-awareness of women which goes against social
expectations, the severe imbalance of the marriage gradient and financial concerns.
First of all, sociologists attributed the hesitant reaction of Taiwanese women to the
32
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idea of marriage to the prevalence of higher education and their direct participation in
the labor market. Thanks to the implementation of popularized education that
emerged from the 1950s to the present, gender was no longer a concern for a marginal
efficiency of investment to a family. According to Professor Ming-Ching Luoh’s
academic essay, “Who are NTU (National Taiwan University) students? Differences
across Ethnic and Gender Groups and Urban/Rural Discrepancy”, before executing
this educational policy, a traditional Taiwanese family would most likely give over all
resources to the male offspring because men inherit the family property and ultimately
carry the family name, not women. Therefore, he must pursue a higher education in
order to manage his family well in the future. In addition, after this policy became a
compulsory obligation for citizens, well-educated women started to mushroom like
bamboo shoots after a spring rain in Taiwan.33
In addition, these educated Taiwanese women started to largely participate in the
ascending market since the 1970s. It accompanied an unprecedented change.
Based on her well-known case study in the sociology field in Taiwan, A story of
Mei-Ling: Between Filial Daughter and Loyal Sister: Global Economy and Family
Politics in Taiwan,” the author and also a sociologist, Anru Lee, pointed out that
Taiwanese women unexpectedly converted their old image of family’s surplus
subordination into a requisite labor power. Before this dramatic transformation
occurred, females were always regarded as merchandise sold at a loss because of the
custom of dowries, which was most often seen in the countryside. In many
agricultural communities in Taiwan, elder residents still follow the traditional Han’s
patrimonial codes to the present day.
Additionally, in The Women Gender & Development Reader, one of the co-writers,
Diane L. Wolf states that:
“In Taiwan, daughters are socialized to be filial and to pay back
the debt they incurred to parents for bringing them up. Parents
socialize daughters that they themselves are worthless, and that
literally everything they have—their bodies, their upbringing,
their schooling—belong to their parents and has to be paid for.
Since daughters permanently leave their natal home upon marriage,
they must pay back their debt early in life. Because daughters
were seen as ‘short-term members’ of the family, parents did
33
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not ‘waste’ resources in schooling them.”34
These notions implied that woman’s education would not change a thing,
because no matter how brilliant, competent, and successful she could be, she needed
to marry someone in any case. Marrying a Taiwanese man means the bride is
marrying his family at the same time. She must take care of her children, in-laws, and
housework. Therefore, getting a degree could not shift those fundamental values at
all. For these reasons, helping daughters to find nice in-laws was the major
responsibility of their parents at all times until this sudden transition.35
In Anru Lee’s A story of Mei-Ling, she articulately recorded Mei-Ling’s words
which reflect her struggles as a filial daughter. When Mei-Ling realized that Lee
actually is a researcher who studies at a prestigious university in the US, she was so
envious of Lee and Lee’s parents’ supportive attitude towards her academic research,
but also felt depressed for her own situation. Mei-Ling said to Anru Lee:
“all my family disagrees with my plan for pursuing higher education,
because they think I will not need it. They only wish that I could get
married as soon as possible; otherwise, I should stay at home and
continuously work for my family. I used to work for my father,
and right now, I’m working for my elder brother. But why should
I always work for them? Why can’t I do something I really want?
Why should I sacrifice myself all the time? Is that fair? Do you
think it is fair?”
Further, Mei-Ling explained to Lee why she would finish her study first rather
than get married. Mei-Ling told Lee:
“I know I must marry someone eventually. If I don’t pursue
my higher education now, then I will not have any opportunity
to do so after I get married. Look at the facts: even my own
parents are very reluctant to support my dream for completing
34
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my education. Who else is willing to support me?
in-laws do that? Don’t be silly!”36

Will my

Progressively, today’s Taiwanese women are contributing their labor force to the
family which has helped them gain some independence and negotiating power in the
family. This has resulted from the popularized higher education.
They are gradually separating themselves from the conventional thinking which is
that a woman should sacrifice all for her family. The rising self-awareness of
Taiwanese women stimulates the new needs of self-fulfillment and their career
ambition, and they are not merely satisfied with occupying full-time domestic roles
anymore.37
One cover story of Cheers in 2005, “The Novel Definition of Work & Love”,
featured and interviewed the Research Sociologist of Academia Sinica in Taiwan38,
Wen-Shan Yang, in which he was asked what the important factors are which drive
Taiwanese women to remain single. He shrewdly explained the case of Taiwanese
women with the sociological term—marriage gradient. However, Yang used a
different approach to reinterpret this term, compared to its standard definition, which
is as follows:
In 1982, Jessie Bernard’s The Future of Marriage has explicated
that it is normative for men to “marry-down” and women to “marry-up”
with respect to education, occupation, and other characteristics.
In a related vein, as a result of this marriage gradient, highly educated
or high earning women(the “cream-of-the crop”), and the less educated
and lower earning men(the “bottom-of-the barrel”) will be less likely
to marry because there are no appropriate mates for them.
Again, the changes in education, employment and income over the last
36
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40 years have resulted in more women becoming “cream-of-the crop”
and this should explain declining marriage rates over time.39
Accepting this established definition, Wen-Shan Yang applied it to explain
Taiwan’s case. In traditional Han society, it is similar that women who marry-up
would have a better chance to maintain a recognized and promising marriage.
However, Mr. Wen-Shan Yang added, “nowadays, Taiwanese women have different
interpretations of the marriage gradient; the gap between both sexes has become more
complicated.” Yang said, “The generally acknowledged process of the marital
relationship has evolved into three stages, and they are Institutional Marriage,
Companionship Marriage, and Independent Marriage.”
The ultimate goal of a couple, who are in an Institutional Marriage, is to have
children in order to extend the family bloodline. In the Institutional Marriage, the
couple’s housework is distinctively distributed. A couple in a Companionship
Marriage, would cherish each other’s spiritual life, and they are more like friends. If
a couple stays in the Independent marriage, both of them are in a comfortable marital
condition, yet they still are seeking their own self-realization.40
Yang indicated that there are a lot of Taiwanese women who are reluctant to get
married for other than the so-called conventional definition of the marriage gradient.
After all, today’s Taiwanese women no longer need to rely on their spouses
financially because of their competitive professions and available job opportunities.
Consequently, they are expecting more from their spouses. Yang argued that,
compared to the western world, the evolution process of marriage becomes condensed
when Taiwanese women have been through so many changes and developments in
such a short period of time. Western women spent more than 30 years to establish
and complete the three stages of marriage evolution. Yet, Taiwanese women only
used a decade to leap to the third stage, the Independent Marriage, because of the fast
changing economy and the opportunities that educational policies offered them, such
as higher education, better professions, and burgeoning ambitions. The sudden jump
in stages indicates the major shift in cultural norms which contributed to the high
39
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unmarried rate since men have not been ready for this drastic change.
Accordingly, most of them are still at the earliest stage—the Institutional
Marriage. In a word, the huge divergence between men and women’s expectation
for marriage is one of the fundamental concerns that led to the Taiwanese women’s
reluctance to get married.
Lastly, economical considerations are a significant force contributing to this
prevailing tendency of singlehood. For instance, in Taiwan, due to the popularized
education, more and more people have to pursue higher degrees in order to equip
themselves for job competition. Consequently, they have to stay in school much
longer for acquiring competitive criteria, and this delays the graduation date, and also
the marriageable date.
According to the IMD’s annual report of world
competitiveness in 2005, the average working hours of one employee are 2,327 hours
a year in Taiwan which listed at Number 4 in the world ranking for the indicator of the
level of hard work.41 Scholar Wei-Shan Yang utilized this result from IMD to argue
that most Taiwanese must work diligently to gain recognition in their workplace.
Yang said, “Taiwanese have to work really hard for their financial stability and that’s
why many women have to consider their job prospect before they decide to get
married.” Just like many other Asian women have to face potential predicaments
after they get married, they will be expected to have children in order to meet their
obligation as filial daughters-in-law. Having babies would bring unpredictable
consequences to their careers. For example, in today’s Taiwan, women are
frequently coerced to sign some unofficial contracts for acquiring employment, such
as The Single Contract and Non-pregnant Ordinance. Generally speaking, The
Single Contract mandates that a female employee should stay single to maintain her
employment. If she decided to get married, she would lose her job.42 As for the
Non-pregnant Ordinance, it indicates that a female employee is forbidden from
getting pregnant. If she insists on having children, she must resign. Even these
unofficial agreements are illegal now after The Gender Equality in Employment Act
has been implemented; however, the lawsuits of gender discrimination in career
women’s workplace are still very common nowadays; in most of these cases, the
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plaintiffs are pregnant employees.43
In addition, due to the recent economical recession in Taiwan, the cost of starting
a family is getting much more expensive than before; especially the salaries of young
graduates can hardly cover their living expenses. Therefore, many single women
would rather live with their parents than establish new families. Sociologists believe
that this situation will change when the economy recovers. As long as the national
economy goes up, people would definitely go back to the marriage market, and it is
just a matter of time.44
All in all, the factor of financial concerns is one of the solid reasons to draw
more and more Taiwanese women away from marriage. However, there are other
factors which are involved in these women’s decision-making process, including their
rising self-awareness creating conflicts with social expectations and the issue of the
marriage gradient.

Conclusion
To summarize, it is evident from these mentioned-case analyses, single Asian
women in Hong Kong, Japan, and Taiwan, have faced some similar concerns which
influenced their decision –making process with regards to marriage, including the
struggles with pursuing self-realization and playing traditional marital roles, the
severe marriage gradient between both sexes, the common patriarchal attitudes among
employers and in government in East Asia, and rising individualism.
First of all, in Taiwan and Japan, women remain single longer because now they
all have much better educational opportunities and job options; therefore, many of
them choose to avoid marriage in order to equip their knowledge bases and then
achieve their ambitions in the workplace. These are aspirations their mothers’
generation could not acquire.
In December 2006, the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for
Asia and the Pacific had a seminar on fertility transition in Asia and its opportunities
43
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and changes. That meeting was in Bangkok, and Mr. Gavin W. Jones45 gave the
presentation on the issue of fertility decline in Asia, “Fertility Decline in Asia:
the Role of Marriage Change”. In his argument, he attributed the declining fertility
rate to the role of women’s marriage delay; further, he discovered the correlative link
between the sharp rise in Labor force participation rates for females (LFPRs) and
delayed marriage. However, it is difficult to establish the causality because of the
“chicken and egg” issue: did women remain single longer because they were in the
workplace, or were they in the workplace because they were still single? Professor
Gavin W. Jones took Japan as one illustration: the female participation rate in Japan’s
labor market has increased faster after 1975 for women aged 25~29 than for women
in other age groups. This seems to suggest that some differences were occurring at
age 25~29. The rate was much higher for single women. The LFPRs for single
women rose over this period from 81% in 1972 to 92% in 1999. It indicates a
substantial increase in the opportunity cost for women to quit their jobs to marry and
have children. Because they stayed at their jobs longer, the age of marriage rose.46
Furthermore, in Hong Kong and Taiwan, all single women seem to have one
concern in common, especially when they attempt to get married. They all have
difficulty in finding eligible candidates for their potential marriages. These young
women’s criteria of education, profession, and financial capability have been highly
elevated, and they add to the challenges of identifying acceptable candidates. In
Taiwan, it is called “marriage gradient”, and Professor Gavin W. Jones’ research has
reinforced it:
In theory, young people may be avoiding marriage for reasons
that differ from those that influence married couples to avoid
having children. For instance, marriage itself could be seen by
young women who intend to pursue a bright career as a distraction
from their goal, or they may be delaying it involuntarily, and these
women often faced a hardness: a lack of suitable partners; the
“good man is hard to find” syndrome. In the real life, marriage is
a package, as it is not simply about the relationship between people,
but tightly linked with childbearing, childrearing, and other
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family obligations.47
In addition, to marry without the plan to have children is still considered
aberrant behavior throughout the East Asian region, particularly in the areas where
they have internalized Confucian doctrines. It is exemplified by a well-known
ancient saying from Mencius (372-289 B.C.), “There are three things which are
unfilial, and to have no posterity is the greatest of them.” There is no doubt that after
marrying, young couples are subjected to considerable pressure to have a baby from
the family and to a lesser extent from friends. As a consequence, the easiest way to
avoid such intense pressure is to remain single. Although single women are also
urged to marry, the pressure may be exerted more on married women to deliver their
first child.48
Also, the general patriarchal attitudes among employers and in government result
in poor workplace conditions for the needs of working mothers, and working wives,
adding huge stress to the lives of women with children. Taking Japanese women as
an example,
their husbands work long hours; child care is limited; baby sitters
are expensive; and if married women decide to work part-time,
they are paid less than half of a full-time worker. Additionally,
Japan ranks No.38 in a UN measure which monitors female
wages and public power; in 1998, its research shows 0.16%
of men took paternity leave.49
Yoshiro Mori, the former Prime Minster before the Koizumi, has argued that
childless women should not receive pension benefits: “It is truly strange to say that we
have to use tax money to take care of women who don't even give birth once, who
grow old living their lives selfishly.”50 This shows how the Japanese patriarchy does
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regard women’s wombs as public property, and the formidable stress they have to
carry if she could not produce children because she stays single. However, as a
married woman, not having children would be scrutinized more closely and criticized
more harshly by the society, and the ensuing surveillance from her in-laws and peers
would engender greater pressure that a single woman would not face. Remaining
single would be a relatively easier choice for Asian women since the subsequent
difficulties of married life could be insufferable.
Finally, the greater stress on individualism has led to self-determination and a
related downgrading in the importance that people attach to realizing social customs
such as getting married and having children.51 Moreover, these three countries are
greatly affected by modern values from the western world, especially when the liberal
ideas of human rights and gender equality have been instilled in widespread
popularized modern education. They all live in a region which has an engrained
family-oriented value system; those who are not family-oriented would be
marginalized as a pariah. Nonetheless, they still have the courage to fight against the
social expectations. Liberation and individualism have played remarkable roles in
the changes to their decision-making process.
All in all, there are several major factors to impel Asian women to avoid
marriage. They include the rapid rise in women’s educational levels and increasing
employment opportunities for giving women strong incentives to enter the workplace;
however, the unwillingness and patriarchal attitudes of employers and governmental
policies have led them to have no choice but stay single. Otherwise, they would
have to face the consequences that accompany marriage and the plight of balancing
work and childrearing. Further, the steepness of marriage gradient makes finding an
ideal spouse extremely complicated. Modern Asian women expect their future
spouses to have equally progressive views on marriage. Lastly, when living in a
collectivism-oriented society like East Asia, she would rather choose an
unconventional lifestyle which will be stigmatized and condemned, and be labeled as
a daredevil than to play a well-recognized traditional role. Individualism plays a
major role in these women’s decision-making process, and it strengthens the faith of
these single women in Asia, the faith that drives them to believe they have the rights
to pursue what they deserve as human beings.
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